INTRODUCTION
Toby Tyler, a former police officer disabled in the line of duty, was convinced that his hometown's attempts to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act' (ADA) were palpably inadequate. The city claimed it was financially incapable of modifying its sidewalks and curbs in a timely manner, and it resisted Tyler's repeated requests for other facilitative adaptations. Although Tyler desired to be active in civic affairs, the city permitted its advisory committees to convene in a restaurant lacking handicap-accessible restrooms, and the City Commission refused to generate audio copies of important documents debated in its biweekly meetings. Tyler enjoyed watching tennis and baseball, and yet the city delayed constructing the handicap ramps necessary to provide egress from certain recreational viewing areas.
After frequent but ultimately ineffective attempts to convince the city to comply voluntarily with the ADA, Tyler brought suit for injunctive relief. However, rather than premising liability solely on violations of the ADA itself, Tyler also included a more adventitious claim: that the city had failed to formulate an adequate transition plan and selfevaluation plan required by Title II's implementing regulations, which See Tyler v City of Manhattan, 857 F Supp 800, 801-12 (D Kan 1994). This case's detailed fact pattern illustrates some of the symptomatic problems facing both public entities and potential plaintiffs under the ADA. The evidence in this case, for example, suggests that the city attempted to modify facilities for the plaintiffs benefit, but was hampered by a severe lack of funds (being granted only $264,000 in state funds for modifying architectural barriers) and sometimes comically adverse circumstances (Tyler was unable to attend a City Commission meeting scheduled to address his concerns because City Hall's sole elevator was under repair and the meeting was being held on the second floor). See id at 807-08. Potential plaintiffs, meanwhile, often face unsympathetic government officials. In this case, for example, when Tyler and his wife suggested that City Hall should be modified to allow handicap access, the City Manager retorted, "[I]f the City altered the [Hall's] threshold ... [you] would then want something else." Id at 807. 1345 these implementing regulations.' Even though each circuit employs original reasoning, all explicitly adopt the framework delineated by Sandoval for assessing conferred private rights of action. The central question, therefore, has been whether Title II's implementing regulations "prohibit what the statute permits" and are thereby powerless to extend Title II's private right of action. ' Thus, at issue in this circuit split is not a choice of test but a determination of an appropriate theory of statutory interpretation. The First and Sixth Circuits, seizing primarily on Sandoval's implicit invocation of the nondelegation doctrine, employ a textualist interpretive strategy to determine Title II's scope-and concomitantly its scope of permissibility. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reads the Sandoval test more metaphorically, employing an intentionalist interpretive methodology to determine whether Title II's congressional drafters intended to prohibit public entities from disregarding the agency regulations at issue. Although the author of the majority opinion in Sandoval is himself an avowed textualist," the opinion offers ambiguous clues to the proper choice of interpretive method. Any case-based solution to the circuit split, as a result, is unlikely to emerge from a straightforward reading of Sandoval.
This Comment, cognizant of this difficulty, rejects both the intentionalist and textualist frameworks embraced by the circuit courts, arguing that Sandoval's implicit reliance on the nondelegation doctrine, compounded with a recent Supreme Court case construing retaliation claims under Title IX, provides a persuasive argument that behavior prohibited by implementing regulations can be assessed through a "contextualist" interpretive framework. More specifically, the Comment proposes that the language of Title II, evaluated under Jackson v Birmingham Board of Education's" contextualist methodology,' 2 encompasses general prohibitions against the failure to create a transition plan or a self-evaluation plan, and thereby confers a private 9 See Sandoval, 532 US at 285. The Court in Sandoval used this test to rule out the possibility that the implementing regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination authoritatively construed Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which the Court interpreted to proscribe only intentional discrimination.
10 Justice Antonin Scalia writes for the majority in Sandoval. See id at 278. For Justice Scalia's adherence to textualism, see, for example, Wisconsin Public Intervenor v Mortier, 501 US 597, 621 (1991) (Scalia concurring) ("[W]e should try to give the text its fair meaning ... thereby affirming the proposition that we are a Government of laws .... That is, at least, the way I prefer to proceed.").
11 544 US 167 (2005) . 12 See id at 177-78. Although Jackson is a Title IX case, its interpretive methodology explicitly relies on the Sandoval test. See id at 178. right of action to enforce these implementing regulations. While no circuits have yet adopted this reasoning, the text and structure of Title II, considered with reference to its legislative milieu, satisfy the contextualist test articulated by Jackson for extending a private right of action.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the origins and legislative history of Title II of the ADA and its implementing regulations, examining Sandoval's significant impact on the interpretation of Title II. Part II analyzes the circuit split, determining that both sides of the split have adopted an erroneous method of statutory interpretation. Part III engages in a thorough analysis of Title II and concludes that both the historical application of the nondelegation doctrine and the precedential force of Jackson require a contextualist reading of the Sandoval test. In conclusion, the Comment applies a contextualist framework to Title II and its implementing regulations, arguing that Title II's broadly worded text and legislative context evidence congressional intent to create a private right of action to penalize noncompliance with Title II's transition plan and self-evaluation plan regulations.
I. TITLE II, IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, AND SANDOVAL
This Part examines the interplay of Title II of the ADA and its implementing regulations, and discusses how the holding of Sandoval and its subsequent application to Title II cases defines the scope of this interplay.
A. ADA Title II: Statutory Background
Congress, concerned with statistics suggesting that over fortythree million physically and mentally disabled Americans suffered from "serious and pervasive" isolation and discrimination, enacted the ADA in 1990. 3 From the beginning, the ADA evidenced congressional intent to remedy a wide swath of exclusionary practices. Thus, 13 The congressional findings stated that individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including ... intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities. 42 USC § 12101(a). The implications of the forty-three million figure have been hotly debated by courts and legal scholars. Compare Colker, The Disability Pendulum at 17 (cited in note 7) (arguing that "Congress recited the 43 million figure as a minimum figure to suggest that a substantial portion of the American population is disabled and would benefit from the protections of the ADA"), with Sutton v United Air Lines, 527 US 471, 487 (1999) (excluding some correctable conditions from the ADA's coverage by reasoning that "[h]ad Congress intended to include all persons with corrected physical limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher number of disabled persons in the findings"). although the ADA was closely modeled on the existing Rehabilitation Act," it extended that statute's punitive reach to private actors' in addition to state actors 6 and included more precise provisions against disability discrimination. Specific language in the ADA demonstrates this intent to combat a larger number of discriminatory methods, including "outright intentional exclusion," "discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers," and "exclusionary qualification standards and criteria."" According to Congress, Title II was specifically tailored to address "passive" or "exclusionary" discrimination by local and state governmentsparticularly the failure to modify existing structural barriers to disability inclusion.' 8 Title II provides that "[s]ubject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."' 9 Consequently, Title II obligates any organization classified as a "public entity" to take efforts to prevent discriminatory exclusion of any 14 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub L No 93-112, 87 Stat 355, codified as amended at 29 USC § 701 et seq (2000) . It appears that Congress intended to create a more sweeping prohibition against disability discrimination in the ADA, as it specifically provided for a minimum level of protection that matched the existing aegis of Rehabilitation Act § 504. See 42 USC § 12201(a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USC § 790 et seq) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title."). The ADA's more expansive remedial provisions were initially lauded as necessary replacements for the flawed security afforded by the Rehabilitation Act. See, for example, Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 Temple L Rev 393, 394 (1991) (contending that at least in the area of combating segregation and isolation of disabled Americans, the Rehabilitation Act "ha[s] been practically a dead letter"). Actual judicial application of the ADA, however, has often resulted in narrowed avenues of relief See Colker, The Disability Pendulum at 16 (cited in note 7) (noting that courts have construed "disability" under the ADA to exclude both persons with controllable epilepsy and those with HIV infections despite earlier rulings finding both cognizable disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act). 15 See 42 USC § 12182(a) ("No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.").
"qualified individual with a disability. 28 This broad language parallels Title II's sweeping scope of enforcement-in fact, the statute has been construed to regulate, among other things: the availability of physical access to public facilities, 2 ' including courtrooms," polling places,' prisons, 4 and public restrooms;" and the availability of services such as equal educational opportunities," accessible transportation, 2 and S 28 freedom from surcharges on specialized services. Perhaps due to the passively discriminatory nature of Title II harms, 29 the statute explicitly authorizes a private right of action to 20 See 42 USC § 12131 (defining "a qualified individual with a disability" as an individual with a disability "who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity"). 21 See 28 CFR § 35.150(a) (2006) (providing that "[a] public entity shall operate each service, program, or activity so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities"). 22 
29
Since the discrimination addressed by Title II is passive in the sense that it arises from nearly imperceptible omissions, rather than deliberate and transparent actions, it appears that potential private plaintiffs have a significant informational advantage over governmental officials with regard to latent statutory violations. Compare Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U Ill L Rev 887,894-95 (2006) (arguing that the ability of public enforcers to effectively reveal wrongdoing is inversely proportional to the complexity of the offense and that "informed insiders" may be best positioned to detect wrongdoing); Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 Harv L Rev 961, 968, 969 n 15 (1994) (describing the "symbiotic relationship between public and private enforcement of the federal securities laws" that arises partially because government actors are "strangers to transactions that give rise to allegations of fraud" and thus do not share the informational advantages of private parties involved directly in the transactions). See also J.l. Case Co v Borak, 377 US 426, 432-33 (1964), abandoned in Sandoval, 532 US at 287 (finding an implied cause of action where a statutory enforce its provisions. Specifically, Title II extends its "remedies, procedures, and rights" to "[a]ny person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 12132."0 Proving this entitlement is not an empty gesture, Title II's enforcement provision unequivocally entitles private citizens to sue noncompliant public entities in federal court; thereby expressing a clear intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 31 , the Court's subsequent decision in Lane, 541 US at 509, ameliorated some of this concern by determining that Title It's abrogation of state sovereign immunity would be resolved on an as-applied basis. See id at 530 ("[Njothing in our case law requires us to consider Title II, with its wide variety of applications, as an undifferentiated whole."). Lane confined its factual holding to the accessibility of judicial services, leaving Title II's remaining applications in flux, but there are indications that the Court will not extend Title II's abrogation of state sovereign immunity beyond court access. See id at 549-54 (Rehnquist dissenting). While the sovereign immunity question is relevant to the ability of private parties to bring lawsuits under Title II's implementing regulations, it is beyond the scope of this Comment and will not be addressed herein, since the cases involved include local entities not implicated by Lane. See Alden v Maine, capable of accommodating several alternative avenues of relief. Namely, Title II licenses suits against "any state or local government" and "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government," 33 Administrative remedies are also available under Title II. An individual may file a complaint with "any agency that he or she believes to be the appropriate agency... or with any agency that provides funding to the public entity that is the subject of the complaint, or with the Department of Justice for referral" within 180 days of the violation. 28 CFR § 35.170(c) (2006 Title II) ; Barnes, 536 US at 187 (concluding that because injunctive relief "is traditionally available in suits for breach of contract," it is similarly available under Title II). 39 See Barnes, 536 US at 187 (providing for recovery only in cases of "intentional conduct"). In these cases, "intentional discrimination" requires that the authorized official has "actual knowledge of discrimination" and "fails adequately to respond." Gebser v Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 US 274, 290 (1998) (defining intentional discrimination for Title IX Despite the uncertainty of damages relief, Title II's private right of action provides an integral enforcement mechanism for structural disability discrimination. An estimated fifty-four million people in the United States are classified as "disabled" under the ADA. These individuals, faced with discrimination, cannot always turn to state law in the absence of ADA protection." In fact, a recent study finds that state law provides relief equivalent to Title II in only thirty-five states, 2 and only twenty-four states possess disability discrimination statutes with coverage analogous to Title II ' While administrative remedies are available, studies have indicated that administrative enforcement of the ADA is rather desultory."
B. Self-Evaluation Plan and Transition Plan Regulations
Self-evaluation plan and transition plan requirements are among a number of implementing regulations promulgated by the Attorney General under the authority of the ADA. Section 204 of Title II authorizes the Attorney General to "promulgate regulations ... that implement [Title II of the ADA]. 4 5 In response to this mandate, the Attorney General fashioned a diverse series of regulations," two of which require public entities to create, within one year of passage of the ADA, a selfevaluation plan and a transition plan to facilitate programmatic and structural modification. The self-evaluation regulation requires a public entity to "evaluate its current services, policies, and practices, and the effects thereof' and modify "any such services, policies, and practices" that of the Civil Rights Act 41 See Colker, The Disability Pendulum, at 154-64 (cited in note 7) (surveying the remedies for disability discrimination under fifty states' regulatory regimes and concluding that state law alone is often an inadequate guard against disability discrimination). 42 See id at 154 (noting that nine states have no enforcement mechanism against state violations and seven others limit potential remedies under Title II). 43 violate Title II.' The transition plan regulation mandates that any public entity obliged to undertake "structural changes to facilities" to meet ADA standards "shall develop ... a transition plan setting forth the steps necessary to complete such changes. 49 Neither the self-evaluation plan nor the transition plan regulation contains an explicit private right of action to remedy noncompliance. If a private right of action to enforce the regulations exists, therefore, it must be implied either from Title 1I's explicit provision or through the text and grammatical structure of the implementing regulations." 1 Sandoval, however, severely circumscribes the type of private actions that can be connoted to extend to implementing regulations. Given the difficulties of obtaining a regulatory remedy for noncompliance, 2 these private actions are often a more palatable option for enforcement-and an inability to bring such suits could severely restrict plaintiffs' actual relief under Title II.
C. Sandoval
Although Sandoval concerned implementing regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, its impact on ADA Title II has been rightly recognized as potentially momentous. Since Title II . Subsequently, the public entity must "[r]eview all the policies and practices that govern the administration of [its] programs, activities, and services." Id. When undertaking this review, the public entity should determine whether any of its policies or practices "adversely affect the full participation of individuals with disabilities." Id. The DOJ's Title I1 Technical Assistance Manual suggests that the following areas in particular require "careful examination": the existence of "physical barriers to access"; communication discrepancies between disabled and nondisabled individuals; "procedures to evacuate individuals with disabilities during an emergency"; accessibility of new construction projects; the familiarity of employees with "policies and practices for the full participation of individuals with disabilities"; and the potential discriminatory effects of hiring. Id. The regulation also requires a public entity to initiate a public forum for comment on the plan, 28 CFR § 35.105(b), and, if it employs more than fifty people, to maintain on file for three years after the self-evaluation " [ is patterned on § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which itself is derived structurally from Title VI, both commentators" and defendants in lower courts-" have identified Sandoval's potentially deleterious effect on private enforcement of Title II's implementing regulations. Indeed, as detailed in Part II, Sandoval has been applied ubiquitously to the transition plan and self-evaluation plan regulations under Title I. Nevertheless it is far from clear that Sandoval, which was decided on principles of statutory interpretation rather than constitutional grounds, creates a generally applicable rule for the derivation of private rights of action.
The dispute at issue in Sandoval began in 1990, when the state of Alabama amended its Constitution, designating English as the official state language. 5 The Alabama Department of Public Safety, directed by James Alexander, required all driver's license exams to be taken in English. 6 Martha Sandoval, a non-English speaking resident of Alabama, sued, claiming the driver's exam regulation violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964's' implementing regulation forbidding recipients of federal financial assistance to "utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin."" ' Like the transition plan and self-evaluation plan regulations promulgated under Title II, the regulation at issue in this case did not itself contain language creating a private cause of action to remedy its violation.
The Supreme Court, granting certiorari, held that the implied private right of action in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not extend to disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI's authority. Declaring that "private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress,"' the Court recognized that a statutory cause of action can be construed to cover a statute's implementing regulation where that regulation "authoritatively construe [ private right of action, it offers lower courts little guidance on the test's application, thereby creating an interpretive vacuum in which two competing approaches have developed. Sandoval finds the disparate-impact regulations at issue not privately enforceable simply because "they ... forbid conduct that § 601 permits. ' 6 7 While this statement is the conclusion of an extensive investigation of prior precedent determining the scope of § 601, it appears that the circuit courts applying the test employ it aphoristically-perhaps to validate their own opportunistic reasoning. Notably, there is no specific indication in Sandoval that the "prohibits what the statute permits" test should preclude a rigorous investigation of legislative intent.6 M Perhaps in response to this interpretive ambiguity, circuits utilizing the test have applied two competing modes of statutory interpretation. The first, as elucidated in the Sixth and First Circuits in Ability Center of Greater Toledo v City of Sandusky" and Iverson v City of Boston, respectively, is predominantly "textualist": it focuses on the text of the organic statute to determine statutory scope and downplays the efficacy of legislative history in determining congressional intent. The second, as expounded by the Tenth Circuit in Chaffin v Kansas State Fair Board,"' is better classified as "intentionalist": it focuses on legislative history and the "broad purposes" motivating the statutory language to place the organic statute in its proper interpretive context. (1978) . But consider Sandoval, 532 US at 285-86, citing Central Bank, 511 US at 173 (finding that "a private plaintiff may not bring a [suit based on a regulation] against a defendant for acts not prohibited by the text of [the statute]") (emphasis added). The Court in Central Bank, however, based its textualist interpretation of 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1993), an implementing regulation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, on context-specific precedent interpreting § 10(b) narrowly. See Central Bank, 511 US at 173-78 ("It is inconsistent with settled methodology in § 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond the scope of conduct prohibited by the statutory text."). But also consider Sandoval, 532 US at 314-15 (Stevens dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's test because "[t]here is simply no reason to assume that Congress contemplated, desired, or adopted a distinction between regulations that merely parrot statutory text and broader regulations.") (emphasis added). In response to the interpretive freedom ostensibly provided by Sandoval, two circuits have precluded private suits to enforce certain Title II implementing regulations, concluding that the transition plan and self-evaluation plan requirements "forbid conduct that the statute permits." In Ability Center, the Sixth Circuit applied the Sandoval framework to a suit brought by individuals against the City of Sandusky for failing to implement a transition plan, determining that § 35.150(d) "creates obligations not necessarily required by [Title II]" and thereby cannot be enforced through a private right of action derived from Title I. Likewise, in a case brought by an individual against the City of Boston for failing to evaluate and modify facilities that violate the ADA, the First Circuit, in Iverson, held that no private right of action exists to enforce either the transition plan or selfevaluation plan regulation because both implementing regulations "impose[] an obligation beyond the [ADA] mandate." 3 Although each of the circuits couches its interpretation of Sandoval's test in slightly different terminology, both ultimately scrutinize Title II's text to determine whether the implementing regulations circumscribe behavior beyond Title II's regulatory scope. The Sixth Circuit interprets the test as one of considering whether the transition plan regulation creates obligations on public entities "explicitly contemplated" by Title II. 74 Its application is unabashedly textualist: to decide whether a regulation is "explicitly contemplated," there must be some unambiguous indication in the statute's text that the implementing regulation is "integral to the achievement of the statute's aims or that Congress considered a public entity's failure to adopt such a [regulation] as a form of discrimination against disabled individuals." 7 ' The First Circuit adopts an even stricter test: if "it 72 385 F3d at 914 ("[Ilt is conceivable that a public entity could fully satisfy its obligations to accommodate the disabled while at the same time fail to put forth a suitable transition plan.").
73 452 F3d at 101-02. Notably, the plaintiffs also brought a coterminous claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, perhaps anticipating a more favorable judgment under the older statute. See id at 97. Nevertheless, the First Circuit construed the claims concurrently, ruling that there was no private right of action under either the Rehabilitation Act or Title II for enforcement of the self-evaluation plan regulation. See id. 74 See Ability Center, 385 F3d at 913 ("If § 35.150(d) imposes obligations not explicitly contemplated by Title II, then it is not enforceable through the Act's private cause of action.").
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Id at 914 (finding that "there is no indication that Congress conceptualized of transition plans or the failure to adopt them in this manner"). The court finds that although the transition plan regulation may create a procedural requirement that encourages public entities to consider and plan ways in which they will accommodate the disabled, and it may ultimately facilitate compli-is ... conceivable that a public entity may be in full compliance with [the organic statute] without observing the commands of the [implementing] regulation[s]," no private right of action is available to enforce the regulations. This test requires only an analysis of the organic statute's text-since "[n]othing in the text of Title II requires public entities to conduct self-evaluations, let alone do so by the date prescribed in the regulations," the self-evaluation plan is not privately enforceable, since it "impose[s] obligations on public entities different than, and beyond, those imposed by the ADA itself."" 2. The Tenth Circuit: searching for Congress's "broad intent."
The Tenth is the solitary circuit to allow private plaintiffs to sue to enforce the transition plan and self-evaluation plan regulations. In Chaffin, the Tenth Circuit found that the transition plan and selfevaluation plan regulations simply "provide the details necessary to implement the statutory right created by § 12132 of the ADA" and therefore "do not prohibit otherwise permissible conduct" under the Sandoval test." In conclusion, it held that Title II's private right of action extended to its implementing regulations, which are "an authoritative and reasonable interpretation of Title II."
Unlike the First and Sixth Circuits, the Tenth construes Sandoval to allow, or even require, a thorough investigation into the legislative history of the organic statute through an interpretive strategy best classified as "intentionalist." The court in Chaffin bases its holding on Congress's purpose in passing the ADA, finding that Congress inance with Title II,... there is no indication that a public entity's failure to adopt a transition plan harms disabled individuals, let alone in a way that Title II claims to prevent or redress.
Id.
Ultimately, the test looks to the literal meaning of the statute. See id (noting that the language of Title II cannot be construed to include transition plan requirements). 76 Iverson, 452 F3d at 101. 77 Id at 101-02 (emphasis added). Unlike the Tenth Circuit, which construes the statutory text expansively, the First gives Title II's text the narrowest credible interpretation. 78 Id at 858. According to the Tenth Circuit, "Sandoval holds only that regulations may not create a private cause of action where no such right was intended by Congress in the statute authorizing promulgation of such regulations." Id at 857 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court's focus is on the broader objectives of Congress when enacting the statute. See id at 858-59 (evaluating Congress's intent when passing Title II). 79 Id at 859 n 1 (noting that once the implementing regulations are determined to be the authoritative and reasonable interpretation of the organic statute, it is unnecessary to evaluate Congress's intent to create a private remedy to enforce the regulations).
80 But see Ability Center, 385 F3d at 912 (using legislative history to determine the scope of Title II in relation to another implementing regulation, 28 CFR § 35.151, which requires curb alterations). The Sixth Circuit's use of legislative history to validate a private right of action to enforce 28 CFR § 35.151, compared with its failure to discuss legislative history with respect to the transition plan regulation, is somewhat surprising, suggesting perhaps that the Sixth Circuit construes the transition plan regulation to so obviously overextend the plain meaning of Title II that interpretive recourse to legislative history is pointless. tended to "prohibit[] a broad, comprehensive concept of discrimination, beyond discrimination motivated by a hostile discriminatory purpose."' 1 Distinguishing Sandoval, the Tenth Circuit reasons that in contrast to Title VI, the ADA regulates disparate impact discrimination.8
Critical to this analysis is an examination of Title II's legislative history. Specifically, the court focuses on the congressional goal when enacting the ADA of providing disabled individuals with "equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic selfsufficiency." Additionally, the court inquires into the historical context of the ADA, referencing Congress's intent to equate Title II with § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which had been previously interpreted to prohibit disparate-impact discrimination' C. Textualism, Intentionalism, and the ADA This circuit split mirrors what many commentators have recognized as a theoretical debate over statutory interpretation waged within the Supreme Court in the last few decades." Although traditionally courts have looked first to the statutory text, their reliance on text has been limited at best.-In fact, courts often have resorted to a variety of nontextual sources to determine congressional intent in the 81 Chaffin, 348 F3d at 858. The Chaffin court contrasts this intent with that of Congress when promulgating Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, claiming that with Title II Congress intended to prohibit architectural and structural discrimination against individuals with disabilities. See id. 82 See id at 859-60 (relying on the legislative history of the ADA, and particularly the remedial parallels between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, to conclude that Title II reaches disparate impact discrimination). 83 Id at 858, quoting 42 USC § 12101(a)(8 86 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L Rev 621, 625-26 (1990) (commenting that courts traditionally used a "soft plain meaning rule," by which "the plainest meaning can be trumped by contradictory legislative history"). face of ambiguous textual imperatives." This interpretive strategy is now generally termed "intentionalism" because it focuses on congressional intent." In contrast, textualism requires statutory interpretation that depends primarily on the "plain meaning" of a statute." In the face of textual ambiguities, textualists employ dictionaries, grammar books, and the traditional common law canons of construction to decipher meaning.O Although textualist attitudes towards legislative history are not monolithic, several prominent textualists have eschewed legislative history entirely." 1 The recent rise to prominence of textualist inquiry has been called influential and even "agenda-setting" in judicial statutory interpretation, as textualism challenged intentionalism's ascendancy in the interpretive arena.92
Certainly with respect to interpretation of the ADA, textualism has proven a dominant force in restricting the statute's scope. The textualism employed by the First Circuit (and to a much lesser degree the Sixth Circuit) exhibits this obsession-to such a degree that this circuit's interpretive strategy is more accurately classified as either "literalism"9 or "strict textualism."" The First Circuit 93 527 US 471,482 (1999) (noting that "[the dissent] relies on the legislative history of the ADA for the contrary proposition that individuals should be examined in their uncorrected state [for the purposes of determining whether they have a disability]," but that "[blecause we decide that, by its terms, the ADA cannot be read in this manner, we have no reason to consider the ADA's legislative history"). 94 
95 See id at 500-02 (Stevens dissenting) (pointing out that both the Senate Report and the Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor explicitly state that "whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids") (citation omitted).
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Cynthia Estlund, The Supreme Court's Labor and Employment Cases of the 2001-2002
Term, 18 Labor Law 291, 306-07 (2002) . See also Colker, The Disability Pendulum at 208-12 (cited in note 7) (noting the "ahistorical" approach the Court takes to the ADA); Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L 19,21 (2000) ("Despite judicial claims that the courts are simply applying the 'plain meaning' of the statute, the courts are choosing narrow readings over broad ones, even in the face of expansive administrative interpretation and strong evidence that Congress intended the statute to be interpreted broadly."). 97 101 Colum L Rev 990,1088 (2001) (associating "strict textualism" with Scalia's views on originalism and legislative history). Consider also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 Loyola LA L Rev 13, 37-38 (1995) ("Strict textualism reflects not looks solely to the "plain language" of Title II, refusing to consider either statutory context or purpose. For example, the court in Iverson reasons that the absence of particular dates for compliance in the ADA indicates that the transition plan regulation's specific temporal requirements render its obligations more extensive than Title II itself." A closer look at the implicit sources by which Sandoval establishes its "prohibits what the statute permits" test, however, argues for a less literal-minded interpretive framework.
III. RESOLUTION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The circuit split turns on the question of whether Sandoval's "prohibit what the statute permits" test should be analyzed under a textualist or intentionalist interpretive methodology. Courts on both sides of the split cite Sandoval to guide their analysis of statutory scope."' Lacking, however, is an interpretive middle ground-"contextualism"which may prove a more accurate framework with which to assess the relation between Title II and its implementing regulations.
Given this oversight, this Part concludes that an autotelic application of the Sandoval framework is by itself inadequate to solve the disagreement at the heart of the circuit split. Specifically, Part III.A introduces the potential middle-ground interpretive methodology of contextualism. Part III.B then argues that the lower courts' misplaced reliance on Sandoval's ostensible textualism overlooks an important interpretive alternative. Namely, this Part argues that Sandoval's implicit invocation of nondelegation principles cannot justify a textualist interpretive methodology. Part III.C then proposes an alternative (contextualist) framework adopted by the Court in Jackson, a Title IX retaliation case, concluding that through Jackson the Supreme Court enumerated and formalized much of Sandoval's analysis. Part III.C applies the Jackson framework to Title II and its implementing regulations, hypothesizing that under the three-part Jackson inquiry, Title II creates a private right of action to enforce self-evaluation and transition plans.
A. Contextualism
Before embarking on an analysis of contextualism as a satisfactory solution to the circuit split, the interpretive methodology must be defined. At the moment, there are at least three theories that assume the appellation "contextualism" in legal commentary. At one extreme, the obedience that the court owes to the legislature, but an improper and indeed arrogant move by a subordinate to assume a role that is equal or even dominant to that of his master.").
99 452 F3d at 101. 100 See Part II.
contextualism has been described as a pseudo-canon of construction whereby statutory words must be construed to accommodate their position in sentences, paragraphs, sections, or parts of a statute."' At the other extreme, some commentators use contextualism to refer to a genus of interpretive strategies that includes intentionalism and purposivism. ' For other commentators, contextualism is best conceived as an interpretive methodology that takes account of the historical and legislative context in which a statute was enacted to divine its meaning. 3 More generally, however, it is possible to understand all these contextualist strategies as points on a continuum-with their differences merely of degree.'°' For the purposes of this Comment, contextualist interpretation will be understood simply as a textualist hybrid that looks to legal and historical context to understand broadly worded statutory language, but does not use legislative history or otherwise inquire into extra-textual manifestations of congressional intent.
For several reasons, a contextualist interpretive strategy is particularly well suited to analyze Title II's statutory scope under the "prohibits what the statute permits" test. Title II, like other civil rights statutes, is specifically modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Moreover, the statute acquired much of its operative language from § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. As a result of these similarities, it appears that the drafters of Title II had certain expectations about how the statute's text was to be understood by the judiciary-and any interpretive attempt that fails to account for these expectations is in danger of misreading the "plain meaning" of the text. More generally, Title II, like its civil rights brethren, does not trade in specificity: its language is broad and potentially ambiguous. In fact, some courts, recognizing Title II's textual ambiguity, have even used the more specific Both circuits denying a private right of action under Title II's selfevaluation and transition plan regulations have employed a textualist analysis based primarily on Sandoval's purportedly textualist bent. Nevertheless, given the nondelegation principle, which appears to underlie the Court's conclusion in Sandoval, this textual reliance may be misplaced. Namely, while commentators have recognized the importance of the nondelegation principle in textualist theories of interpretation and canons of construction, the historical judicial application of nondelegation appears to exhibit a more liberal theory of statutory interpretation. Moreover, the principles underlying nondelegation generally corroborate the use of a contextualist (rather than intentionalist) interpretive strategy, as is demonstrated in a recent Supreme Court case concerning retaliation claims under Title IX.
The nondelegation doctrine favors a contextualist application
of Sandoval.
Although Sandoval does not explicate the constitutional basis for its holding, an analysis of its citations indicates a tacit reliance on the nondelegation doctrine. Namely, the Court in Sandoval notes that the implicit basis for its test is "a particular understanding of the genesis of private causes of action."' This understanding mandates that, "[1]ike substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. ' ' ,,I For support, the Court cites a long line of cases emanating from an early twentieth century 105 See Parker v Universidad de Puerto Rico, 225 F3d 1, 5 (1st Cir 2000) ("The language of Title II does not elaborate on the obligation of a public entity to an individual with a disability in the provision of 'services, programs, or activities.' We must rely for specifics on the regulations promulgated under Title II.") (citation omitted). Given these factors, it is surprising that the Supreme Court continues to prefer textualism in its interpretation of the ADA. See, for example, Sutton, 527 US at 482. One commentator has suggested that the apparent resistance of a majority on the Court to a less literal interpretation of the ADA arises from the textualist preference for a colloquial definition of "disability." See Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures at 145-48 (cited in note 88). Others view the more limiting interpretive strategy as part of a larger conscious effort to limit the ADA's influence. See conception of Article I, § 1 of the Constitution."n This conception provided that Congress, being endowed singularly with lawmaking power, could not constitutionally delegate this power to the executive-the nondelegation doctrine." 9 At the roots of this case law appears a formalization of the doctrine, detailing that [t]he power of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not the power to make law-for no such power can be delegated by Congress-but the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute."°S andoval's implicit invocation of the nondelegation doctrine serves to buttress the Court's inquiry into Title VI -and perhaps insinuates that the "prohibit what the statute permits" test should be analyzed under a textualist framework. While the constitutional merits of the nondelegation doctrine are widely debated, " the Court and some commentators have correctly recognized nondelegation's influence on theories of textualist statutory interpretation and doctrinal canons of construction." In Sandoval, the Court ostensibly appeals to the textualist implications of nondelegation, noting that precedent requires the "language" of the statute to control and finding that a regulation may only summon a cause of action Congress created "through statutory 108 lacks any foundation in constitutional text and structure, in standard originalist sources, or in sound economic and political theory."). 112 See Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361,373 n 7 (1989) ("In recent years, our application of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional.") (emphasis added); John E Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon ofAvoidance, 2000 Sup Ct Rev 223,237-38 (discussing Mistretta); John F Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum L Rev 673, 675 (1997) (concluding that "textualism should be understood as a means of implementing a central and increasingly well-settled element of the separation of powers-the prohibition against legislative self-delegation"); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U Chi L Rev 315, 315-16 (2000) (theorizing that the doctrine has been "relocated rather than abandoned" and is now vindicated through several canons of construction that constrain certain agency activities).
text.".. This explicit reference to textual inquiry is common of textualist interpretive theory, which avers legitimacy from the bicameralism and presentment requirements for legislation. ' Notwithstanding the Court's attempts in Sandoval to alleviate its implicit nondelegation concerns with a sort of "clear statement rule" derived through textualism, a historical analysis of the doctrine's application reveals a more ambivalent approach to statutory interpretation. Traditionally, the nondelegation doctrine required Congress, when delegating its legislative power to the executive branch, to "lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.' ' ... To determine whether a principle was "intelligible," a court was permitted to look to statutory context to find that an otherwise vague grant of power was not "so indefinite as to confer an unlimited power.".... In some conceptions of this review, a court was also permitted to investigate Congress's purpose to give specific meaning to a vague delegation of lawmaking authority. ' 17 This historical inquiry, which is emblematic of a contextualist theory of statutory interpretation, reveals a tradition of judicial deference to Congress's delegation of its legislative power.
Deference in the context of the traditional nondelegation doctrine and in the case of Sandoval's implication of a private right of action may differ substantially enough, however, to require a textualist inquiry into the scope of statutory permissibility. Specifically, if the Sandoval test can be construed as a "nondelegation canon,".. perhaps requiring a more literal interpretation of what the organic statute permits will be necessary. 9 Under a nondelegation canon theory, "the nondelegation canons [generally] have the salutary function of insuring that important rights and interests will not be compromised unless 113 532 US at 291 (emphasis added). 114 Scalia himself, as well as other prominent textualists, occasionally defends textualism on the grounds that it follows from Article I's requirements of bicameralism and presentment. See, for example, Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 3, 9-13, 34-35 (cited in note 89). For the connections between bicameralism, presentment, and nondelegation, see John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv L Rev 2387, 2434 n 179 (2003) ("Similarly, the nondelegation doctrine, to the extent that it still has force, depends on structural inferences from the constitutional prescription of bicameralism and presentment."). 115 Congress has expressly decided to compromise them. ' ' 2 Since these canons of construction do not create institutional problems of judicial competence,l" perhaps this less deferential mode of statutory interpretation is preferable. ' Nonetheless, while the function of the Sandoval test as a nondelegation canon perhaps rules out a traditional intentionalist inquiry, the underlying policy goals of the nondelegation doctrine appear to be best satisfied under a contextualist, rather than textualist, interpretive strategy. One important justification for the nondelegation doctrine is that by requiring legislatures to draft specific language when delegating legislative power, the burdens and costs to Congress of creating linguistic specificity will require any delegation to be the product of democratic consensus. "3 There is no reason to believe, however, that a more literal interpretation of the organic statute will differentiate statutes based on democratic consensus from those that are the product of special interest lobbying. Namely, Congress's views on what constitutes specific language are largely contextual -influenced to a significant degree by how the judiciary has interpreted prior legislation. In the case of Title II, for example, congressional drafters appear to have specially modeled the statute's language after that of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, with the expectation that courts would rule on its provisions similarly."' Given this reasonable expectation, perhaps the language agreed upon was in fact considered "specific" by the enacting Congress.
Especially in the case of inferring private rights of action, an overly deferential attitude toward Congress may be counterproductive. One problem nondelegation appears to address is the infringement of certain rights without the protections of democratic deliberation. ' 2 Private rights of action, however, grant individual rights. Con- 120 Id at 338 (emphasis added). 121 See id at 326-28,338. 122 One potential argument for literalism in these situations is that it would encourage greater clarity from Congress. See Sunstein, 47 Duke L J at 1053 (cited in note 97) ("[Lliteralism can be justified as analogous to an information-eliciting rule in the law of contract, designed to force the parties (or in this case, the Congress) to speak with greater clarity."). 123 When legislators make all important policy decisions themselves, which is equivalent to congressional policy making, agencies have no discretion. When laws leave the details of public policy to the executive to fill in, then agencies have greater discretion. And it is Congress who chooses a point along this continuum by writing detailed or broad legislation. 124 See note 14. 125 See Sunstein, 67 U Chi L Rev at 320-21 (cited in note 112) ("[T]he requirement of legislative clarity might also seem to be a check on the problems of factional power and selfinterested representation, two of the problems most feared by the framers. Indeed, the nondele-sequently, the concern for deliberative democracy may not be as acute in these situations. In fact, when agencies grant individual rights without foreclosing other individual rights, perhaps the judiciary should generally be more deferent to the agency rule. The right to sue, of course, will inevitably remove a corollary right of some entity not to be sued -and this may well be a right worth protecting through nondelegation. Where however, as in the case of Title II, the entity giving up the right not to be sued is public, sovereign immunity seems a more direct method of protecting these public entities than a roundabout clear statement principle functioning as nondelegation's modem avatar.
Just as principles of judicial minimalism cast doubt on the use of literal textualism in the nondelegation context, concerns about subversion of the legislative process argue for a more suspicious attitude toward legislative history. As previously mentioned, the generally accepted virtue of a statutory interpretation species of nondelegation is that clear statement rules decrease the opportunity for special interest groups to capture the legislative process and raise the decision costs of legislation.' 26 While a contextualist interpretive methodology accounts for the unspoken and perhaps unconscious congressional preferences expressed through linguistic context, intentionalism goes one step further, evaluating spoken and presumably conscious preferences, which, as commentators and judges have recognized, can be manipulated by special interest groups." ' In this regard, contextualism, offering a middle-ground approach, best addresses the concerns underlying nondelegation in statutory interpretation.
Jackson formalizes the contextualist reading of Sandoval.
A recent Supreme Court case, Jackson, formalizes this contextualist framework for analyzing statutory scope under Sandoval. In Jackson, a women's basketball coach brought suit under Title IX, claiming his dismissal was retaliation for his vocal complaints about the lack of support for women's sports at the school. ' 2 The Court ruled that although such retaliation was explicitly prohibited only by a Department of Education implementing regulation, a contextualist reading of Title IX's broad language preempted the standard Sandoval analysis.' 29 Specifigation doctrine might be taken as a central means of reducing the risk that legislation will be a product of efforts by well-organized private groups to redistribute wealth or opportunities in their favor."). 126 See Manning, 2000 Sup Ct Rev at 238-42 (cited in note 112). See also notes 114,121, and 122. 127 See, for example, Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 34 (cited in note 89) ("One of the routine tasks of the Washington lawyer-lobbyist is to draft language that sympathetic legislators can recite in a prewritten 'floor debate'-or, even better, insert into a committee report."). 128 In Jackson, the Court found several aspects of Title IX probative to the statute's extension to retaliation claims: the Court noted that Title IX "is a broadly written general prohibition on discrimination, followed by specific, narrow exceptions to that broad prohibition";' 6 that judicial precedent had "repeated[ly] ... constru[ed] 'discrimination' under Title IX broadly";' 35 and that the historical-legal context in which Title IX was introduced "provides a valuable context for understanding the statute." An analysis of Title II's historical-legal context finds many similarities with Title IX -suggesting that under Jackson's contextualist analysis, self-evaluation and transition plan regulations should be enforceable through a private right of action.
1. Title II is a broadly written statute reminiscent of Title IX.
Title II and Title IX, both being derived structurally from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, contain remarkably similar language. Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." ' 37 In virtually identical language, Title II provides, "[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."' 8 Moreover, like Justice O'Connor documented in Jackson about Title IX, Title II is "followed by specific, narrow exceptions to [its] broad prohibition," '1 3 9 suggesting that the failure of Title II to mention transition or self-evaluation plans is not necessarily material.
A more complicated question, however, is whether failure to create a transition plan or self-evaluation plan, like retaliation in Jackson, can plausibly be construed as "exclud[ing] [an individual with a disability] from participation in or den[ying] the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public entity."' While a standard plain Ian-134 544 US at 175. 135 guage reading of Title II would probably deny that transition or selfevaluation plans are "services, programs, or activities,"' it is likely that the Jackson majority would disagree. In Jackson, because retaliation was both "intentional" and "discriminatory" under the broadest reading of those terms, the Court found a private right of action to enforce retaliation claims. ' Since a refusal to create a self-evaluation plan or a transition plan is simply a "denial," and because either plan can arguably be classified as a "service," 141 it appears that, under the accommodating Jackson analysis, transition and self-evaluation requirements can plausibly fit within Title II's regulatory scope.
Courts have interpreted "programs, services, and activities" in
Title II liberally.
Title II's broad language, and particularly its directive that no otherwise qualified individual shall "be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,"'" has, like Title IX, been construed to apply to a wide range of factual situations. As previously mentioned, courts have interpreted Title II to govern: the availability of physical access to public facilities,' 5 including courtrooms,'46 polling places, 147 prisons,' ' and public restrooms;' 9 and the availability of services such as equal educational opportunities ' o and accessible transportation.' One case in particular, Klinger v Director, ' is emblematic of the liberal judicial interpretation of "services." In Klinger, the Eighth Circuit held that a municipality violated Title II by requiring disabled individuals buying placards indicative of handicapped status to pay a surcharge.' 3 Although the court noted that "services" did not encompass the specific form of handicapped plac-ments" under different statutory schemes.'6' Lower courts, when interpreting the ADA, have integrated prior decisions interpreting the Rehabilitation Act. ' 
62
Since Title II, moreover, explicitly adopts the enforcement scheme of the Rehabilitation Act, a contextualist reading of the statute would conclude that Title II's drafters intended it to extend the Rehabilitation Act's remedial regime-which includes regulations implementing transition and self-evaluation plans. Namely, Title II mandates that the Attorney General should promulgate regulations consistent with the Rehabilitation Act's existing implementing regulations. ' These regulations include requirements of a transition plan'6 and self-evaluation plan. 165 Thus, requiring a transition or self-evaluation plan could have been comprehended by Congress when it drafted Title 1I. More importantly, however, in 1985, the Supreme Court in Alexander v Choate6" found that the Rehabilitation Act, unlike Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, prohibits disparate impact discrimination. '6 ' As a result, at the time the ADA was drafted, congressional drafters had no reason to believe that Title II's private right of action would not extend to instances of disparate impact discrimination-and no reason to believe that violation of transition plan and self-evaluation plan regulations was not an instance of disparate impact discrimination. CONCLUSION This Comment proposes a new interpretive methodology for Sandoval's "prohibit what the statute permits" test. It argues that both the historical application of and policy goals underlying the nondelegation doctrine, in addition to a recent Supreme Court case construing Title IX's scope, buttress a conclusion that what the organic statute "permits" should be analyzed under a contextualist interpretive framework. This solution will not only provide a much-needed remedy under Title II's transition plan and self-evaluation plan regulations, but also provide the proper motivation for public entities to facilitate compliance with ADA Title II.
